Mikorist

znam jednog lika Zlaju - kome se strasno svidja A klasa - F5 - itd...medjutim on je promeino 6 cevnih i oko 15 razlicitih tranzistorskih pojacala.obicno prodje u proseku izmedju 10-15 godina dok uzavreli audiofil dodje do zakljucka da mu se u stvarina pocetku svidjala A klasa i da je to to...

axato sam i ja mislio -a razneo mi je zvucnike od 2x100w

pravi audiofili ih nikad ne gase

kada vec skupljas starudije - kreni sa recimo : Musical Fidelity A1 - pa ga poslusaj.promeni mu svakako elektrolite. kad skupis vise para - gledaj da napravis sam neko u A klasi - sa shema ovde na forumu - ili plati da ti neko sastavi. tada si zavrsio si dozivotno sa pojacalom. (moje misljenje) naravno treba imati i zvucnike.

kad skuvas kafu na hladnjaku od pojacala to je A klasa

jesi imao nekad A klasu - i slusao sporete ?

skupljas stara pojacala ?

ja cu da opalim po drustvenim igrama:

On October 14, 2011, a research lab with strong international connections alerted us to a sample that appeared to be very similar to Stuxnet. They named the threat "Duqu" [dyü-kyü] because it creates files with the file name prefix “~DQ”. The research lab provided us with samples recovered from computer systems located in Europe, as well as a detailed report with their initial findings, including analysis comparing the threat to Stuxnet, which we were able to confirm. Parts of Duqu are nearly identical to Stuxnet, but with a completely different purpose. Duqu is essentially the precursor to a future Stuxnet-like attack. The threat was written by the same authors (or those that have access to the Stuxnet source code) and appears to have been created since the last Stuxnet file was recovered. Duqu's purpose is to gather intelligence data and assets from entities, such as industrial control system manufacturers, in order to more easily conduct a future attack against another third party. The attackers are looking for information such as design documents that could help them mount a future attack on an industrial control facility. Duqu does not contain any code related to industrial control systems and is primarily a remote access Trojan (RAT). The threat does not self-replicate. Our telemetry shows the threat was highly targeted toward a limited number of organizations for their specific assets. However, it’s possible that other attacks are being conducted against other organizations in a similar manner with currently undetected variants. The attackers used Duqu to install another infostealer that could record keystrokes and gain other system information. The attackers were searching for assets that could be used in a future attack. In one case, the attackers did not appear to successfully exfiltrate any sensitive data, but details are not available in all cases. Two variants were recovered, and in reviewing our archive of submissions, the first recording of one of the binaries was on September 1, 2011. However, based on file compile times, attacks using these variants may have been conducted as early as December 2010. One of the variant’s driver files was signed with a valid digital certificate that expires August 2, 2012. The digital certificate belongs to a company headquartered in Taipei, Taiwan. The certificate was revoked on October 14, 2011. Duqu uses HTTP and HTTPS to communicate with a command-and-control (C&C) server that at the time of writing is still operational. The attackers were able to download additional executables through the C&C server, including an infostealer that can perform actions such as enumerating the network, recording keystrokes, and gathering system information. The information is logged to a lightly encrypted and compressed local file, which then must be exfiltrated out. The threat uses a custom C&C protocol, primarily downloading or uploading what appear to be JPG files. However, in addition to transferring dummy JPG files, additional data for exfiltration is encrypted and sent, and likewise received. Finally, the threat is configured to run for 36 days. After 36 days, the threat will automatically remove itself from the system. Duqu shares a great deal of code with Stuxnet; however, the payload is completely different. Instead of a payload designed to sabotage an industrial control system, the payload has been replaced with general remote access capabilities. The creators of Duqu had access to the source code of Stuxnet, not just the Stuxnet binaries. The attackers intend to use this capability to gather intelligence from a private entity to aid future attacks on a third party. While suspected, no similar precursor files have been recovered that predate the Stuxnet attacks. You can find additional details in our paper here. The research lab that originally found the sample has allowed us to share their initial report as an appendix. We expect to make further updates over the coming days. Key points: • Executables using the Stuxnet source code have been discovered. They appear to have been developed since the last Stuxnet file was recovered. • The executables are designed to capture information such as keystrokes and system information. • Current analysis shows no code related to industrial control systems, exploits, or self-replication. • The executables have been found in a limited number of organizations, including those involved in the manufacturing of industrial control systems. • The exfiltrated data may be used to enable a future Stuxnet-like attack. Note: At press time we have recovered additional variants from an additional organization in Europe with a compilation time of October 17, 2011. These variants have not yet been analyzed. More information will follow. Update [October 18, 2011] - Symantec has known that some of the malware files associated with the W32.Duqu threat were signed with private keys associated with a code signing certificate issued to a Symantec customer. Symantec revoked the customer certificate in question on October 14, 2011. Our investigation into the key’s usage leads us to the conclusion that the private key used for signing Duqu was stolen, and not fraudulently generated for the purpose of this malware. At no time were Symantec’s roots and intermediate CAs at risk, nor were there any issues with any CA, intermediate, or other VeriSign or Thawte brands of certificates. Our investigation shows zero evidence of any risk to our systems; we used the correct processes to authenticate and issue the certificate in question to a legitimate customer in Taiwan. Update [October 19, 2011] - Updated link to paper. Also, our authentication team has written a blog on their investigation into the private key usage by Duqu. http://www.symantec.com/connect/w32_duqu_precursor_next_stuxnet

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0945513/

kutije su vrh - sjajno

ja koristim ReJig http://www.videohelp.com/tools/ReJig da napravim prvo jedan fajl. (VOB demultiplexing) ni manjeg programa ni boljeg za mene. radi i obrnuto (VOB multiplexing)

odavde : http://www.videohelp.com/tools/sections/dvd-to-avi-divx-xvid

Squeezebox Touch Tweak - ALSA Real-Time I spent some time trying out my ALSA real-time kernel mods on the Touch. I went though the steps to isolated the "audio threads", the "real-time clock IRQ", and the "spdif IRQ" and tried different values and different combinations. Much clearer vocals, more open and clean sound stage, lows go deeper and clearer...the difference is not subtle! Expect natural smoothness with a good sense of clarity, increased separation within the sound stage, vocals are clear without being harsh and everything sounds more realistic. The goal is to: [*]increase audio threads priority [*]prevent audio threads from sharing interrupt lines [*]adjust interrupts/processes according to their use Prerequisites: You must have a Network connection, you must know your Touch's IP address and you must navigate to Advanced~~~> Remote Login: Enable ssh Using the WinSCP tool from a Windows machine do the following steps 1~4. Click to Enlarge - Apply your Touch's IP address and enter the information as seen. Detailed steps for the mod. After WinSCP has started hit CTRL+T to open a console window then enter the information in yellow, Execute to apply. If you don't like it simply reboot and the values will revert back to the original.1) Find the IRQ number for the Real-Time process to change cat /proc/interrupts ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 25: 0 - mxc_rtc <~~~~~~~Real time clock = IRQ25 47: 7 - spdif <~~~~~~~~Spdif = IRQ47 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 2) Find the process ID ps -e ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 5 ? 00:04:41 sirq-timer/0 <~~~~~~~~PID5 = Audio thread 11 ? 00:00:00 sirq-hrtimer/0 <~~~~~~PID11 = Audio thread 367 ? 00:00:00 IRQ-47 <~~~~~~~~~~PID367 = Spdif IRQ47 407 ? 00:00:00 IRQ-25 <~~~~~~~~~~~PID407 = Real time clock IRQ25 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 3)Change the process priority chrt -f -p 93 11 <~~~~~~Audio thread chrt -f -p 91 5 <~~~~~Audio thread chrt -f -p 59 367 <~~~~~Spdif [see Fine Tuning section below for alternate suggested values] chrt -f -p 87 407 <~~~~~Real-Time Clock ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ /root$ chrt -f -p 59 367 <~~~~~~Enter on command then Execute pid 367's current scheduling policy: SCHED_FIFO pid 367's current scheduling priority: 40 <~~~~~Old value pid 367's new scheduling policy: SCHED_FIFO pid 367's new scheduling priority: 59 <~~~~~New valuee ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 4)Verify the change ps -eLo pid,cls,rtprio,pri,nice,cmd | grep -i "irq" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 5 FF 91 131 - [sirq-timer/0] 9 FF 89 129 - [sirq-tasklet/0] 11 FF 93 133 - [sirq-hrtimer/0] 49 FF 90 130 - [iRQ-34] 367 FF 59 99 - [iRQ-47] 407 FF 87 127 - [iRQ-25] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Set it and Forget it. ***Note: To make sure YOUR process ID's are the same on YOUR SB-Touch do steps 1 and 2 above first.*** 1) Navigate to the rcS file [etc/init.d/rcS] double clicking it will open it. 2) Enter the yellow portion below into the "rcS" file. 3) Save the file and close the window. 4) CTRL+T to open a command line window and type reboot [Execute] Click Image to Enlarge...How-To Visual Reference ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~# Start wlan#/etc/init.d/wlan start <~~~~~Comment out ie [add # mark] this line to insure WiFi does not startiwconfig wlan0 txpower off <~~~~~~~Add this line to insure WiFi is off# Start Samba#if [ -x /etc/init.d/samba ]; then <~~~~~~Comment out these lines to prevent Samba from starting# /etc/init.d/samba start fi#Change priorities <~~~~Add these five lines at the bottomchrt -f -p 93 11chrt -f -p 91 5chrt -f -p 59 367chrt -f -p 87 407 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Fine Tuning for Your SystemI encourage everyone to try different values for the SPDIF process ie "367". Apply the change as shown in step 3 above, the change takes affect immediately after you select Execute. The new value will stay in affect until either a reboot or a new value is entered.In some cases the vocals or higher octave notes may seem too focused, a lower value for the SPDIF process will resolve this...try 44, 48, or 53.One of these values is likely to suit your tastes and system best.Update: The folks at Squeezebox Forum came up with some very good supplements for this mod that really makes everything gel together nicely. See alsa_jive processes. These are the default priority settings for the Touch without the adjustments. The 40 value is a busy interrupt line with so many [27] processes sharing the same priority. Two processes are already called out as having higher priority. The IRQ34 interrupt which is for direct memory access, and the tasklet process which responds to IRQ requests and insures that tasklets are scheduled on time. Per FFADO IRQ Priorities suggestions the audio threads should be scheduled higher than the tasklet but still have unique values. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ /root$ ps -eLo pid,cls,rtprio,pri,nice,cmd | grep -i "irq" 4 FF 40 80 - [sirq-high/0] 5 FF 40 80 - [sirq-timer/0] 6 FF 40 80 - [sirq-net-tx/0] 7 FF 40 80 - [sirq-net-rx/0] 8 FF 40 80 - [sirq-block/0] 9 FF 89 129 - [sirq-tasklet/0] 10 FF 40 80 - [sirq-sched/0] 11 FF 40 80 - [sirq-hrtimer/0] 12 FF 40 80 - [sirq-rcu/0] 49 FF 90 130 - [iRQ-34] 99 FF 40 80 - [iRQ-14] 116 FF 40 80 - [iRQ-10] 125 FF 40 80 - [iRQ-42] 126 FF 40 80 - [iRQ-41] 236 FF 40 80 - [iRQ-22] 258 FF 40 80 - [iRQ-57] 264 FF 40 80 - [iRQ-33] 305 FF 40 80 - [iRQ-37] 334 FF 40 80 - [iRQ-122] 346 FF 40 80 - [iRQ-17] 351 FF 40 80 - [iRQ-123] 356 FF 40 80 - [iRQ-7] 358 FF 40 80 - [iRQ-102] 359 FF 40 80 - [iRQ-8] 367 FF 40 80 - [iRQ-47] 385 FF 40 80 - [iRQ-11] 395 FF 40 80 - [iRQ-12] 407 FF 40 80 - [iRQ-25] 416 FF 40 80 - [iRQ-45] 1341 TS - 19 0 grep -i irq ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ https://sites.google...ox-touch-tweaks

NO NEWS

http://soundcheck-au...toolbox-20.html http://www.diyaudio....ifications.html

videti opsirnije: http://www.ethereali...onstruction.htm

[*]Three seperated self-adjusting modules for high-midrange and bass: Two bass modules, One high-midrange module [*]Cabinet-walls up to 5" thick, optimized internal aerodynamic conditions [*]Four 220mm (9") Thiel & Partner (Accuton) woofers, exclusively made for Tidal [*]Two 173mm (7") Thiel & Partner (Accuton) long excuursion midrange-woofers, exclusively made for Tidal [*]One 30mm (1.2") Thiel & Partner (Accuton) tweeter, exclusively made for Tidal http://www.tidal-aud...ish/sunray1.htm

http://www.newlaunch..._cost_26000.php

mislim da ce asterisk da prevazidje i skype jednog dana http://www.asterisk.org/ jeftino telefoniranje je super - a dzabe je dzabe. sve u tom pravcu se krece - Open Source Communications placace se samo prikljucak za internet ... a ima i pbxinflash http://pbxinaflash.net/

mogu i ja da uvedem sad ovde opciju video poziv - u lokalu na nasem serveru.i to kroz chat foruma -slicno kao skype.to i nije nije neka velika mudrost vise.pitanje je da li je to bas za svaki sajt - pogotovo prosecni.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnbjypfmFqI http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZgrkU1zP6t4 gledam/slusam ovaj HD

za pocetak onaj rostilj od pre 2 godine

i mi cemo kume to da radimo samo.. sutra (malo)svaka cast sto se frendovi oprganiziraju - za svaku pohvalu